Corporations - Minimum Subscription Requirements - Statute of Limitations and Stockholders\u27 Liability by Eslien, Howard W.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 21
Issue 3 April 1937 Article 8
Corporations - Minimum Subscription
Requirements - Statute of Limitations and
Stockholders' Liability
Howard W. Eslien
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Howard W. Eslien, Corporations - Minimum Subscription Requirements - Statute of Limitations and Stockholders' Liability, 21 Marq. L.
Rev. 147 (1937).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol21/iss3/8
RECENT DECISIONS
attorney general, or any person in the name of the state, under Section 286.36,
to vacate the corporate charter. The court is aided in reaching this interpre-
tation by Section 180.08(6), which provides that the secretary of state may
rescind the forfeiture on the payment of $25 and the filing of a proper affidavit.
The court says that this section indicates that an offending corporation "might
still be recognized as a valid operating legal entity on compliance with certain
conditions," and therefore Section 180.08(2) does not declare an absolute
forfeiture.
PAUL G. NoELCE.
CORPORATION-MINIMUM SuBscRIPTIoN REQUIREMENTS-STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS AND STOCKHOLDERS' LiABiLiT.-Articles of incorporation were signed and
filed, and a certificate of organization was issued. Before 50 per cent of the
stock had been subscribed, the corporation borrowed $2,000 from the bank.
Six months later the 50 per cent was subscribed. The original note was renewed
each year for seven years. The interest was paid semi-annually by the corpora-
tion. All of the defendants, stockholders of the corporation, knew of the original
note and consented to the renewals, and had knowledge of the interest pay-
ments. Two years after the last renewal the bank began this action, based on
the statutory liability of Section 180.06, Wisconsin Statutes (1935) against
the defendants. The trial court held that the plaintiff was barred by the statute
of limitations, that the bank could reach either the corporation or the stock-
holders, and that the payment of interest by the corporation debtor did not toll
the statute as to the stockholders. On appeal by the bank, held, judgment
affirmed, the court holding that while the corporation debtor and the stock-
holders were not joint debtors they could be sued together, and that stock-
holders may avail themselves of the bar of the statute of limitations even when
the corporation could not do so. Bank of Verona v. Stewart, (Wis. 1936) 270
N.W. 534.
To escape personal liability the stockholders of a corporation, organized and
incorporated under the local statutes, must comply with Section 180.06, Sub-
section 4, which places the penalty of personal liability on existing stockholders
for any corporate obligation incurred before 50 per cent of the capital stock has
been subscribed and 20 per cent paid in. The Wisconsin court has held that a
creditor of a corporation debtor cannot fix the stockholder with personal respon-
sibility under the above statute, when he has already elected to proceed against
the corporation. Kaestner v. Kuechle, 194 Wis. 72, 216 N.W. 141 (1927). The
trial judge made much of that case which the appellate court purported to over-
rule, pointing out that it was contrary to the policy of Section 286.18 of the
Wisconsin Statutes (1935). Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that the
stockholders in the instant case were protected by the statute of limitations
although they knew that the corporation debtor had been making interest pay-
ments within the six year period. Section 330.47 of the Wisconsin Stats. (1935),
pertaining to payments by joint contractors, did not govern this case because the
stockholder and the corporation were not co-obligors. Cf. (1935) 20 MARQ. LAw
REv. 42. A mortgagor and his vendee who has assumed and agreed to pay the
mortgage are not co-obligors; they may be sued in the same action, but conduct
on the part of the vendee will not affect the mortgagor's standing as to the
statute of limitations. Cottrell v. Shepherd, 86 Wis. 649, 57 N.W. 983 (1894).
The Cottrell case follows the majority rule. See Note (1922) 18 A.L.R. 1027,
1033. It is generally stated that payment by any one liable tolls the statute of
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limitations as to all persons so liable who have knowledge of and assented to
it. 37 C.J. 1160. The court felt that the Cottrell case was decisive of the case at
issue. California, Kansas and New York have statutes limiting the period of
liability of stockholders for corporate obligations. Under such a statute the
mere extension of time to the corporation for the payment of a debt, does not
extend the statutory liability of the stockholders. Redington v. Cornwall, 90 Cal.
49, 27 Pac. 40 (1891) ; Brigham v. Nathan, 62 Kan. 243, 62 Pac. 319 (1900). The
giving of renewal notes by a corporation does not create a new obligation or
extend the limitation period on stockholder's statutory liability. Hyman v. Cole-
man, 82 Cal. 650, 23 Pac. 62 (1890) ; Goodall v. Jack, 127 Cal. 258, 59 Pac. 575
(1899); Newman v. Nickell, 50 Cal. App. 138, 194 Pac. 710 (1920); Brown v.
Ball, 123 Cal. App. 758, 12 P. (2d) 28 (1932). However, where the effect of the
change in a corporation's obligation is to create a new obligation, the limitation
period begins to run again on the new liability from the date of its creation.
More v. Hutchinson, 187 Cal. 623, 203 Pac. 87 (1921).
HowARj W. EsUEN.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-SCOPE oF AUTHORITY-AUTOMOBILE SALESMEN.-The
plaintiff approached a salesman at the defendant's garage to arrange a deal for
one of the defendant's used cars. The car he wanted was a Ford. He wanted
to turn his old car in on the newer one. The salesman consulted the defendant's
sales manager, who was willing to allow the buyer $195 for his old car. The
plaintiff, at first, left his car at the garage for the salesmen to sell at the
highest figure they could get. Two days later he decided to accept the $195
offer. The sales manager confirmed the offer. The salesman made out the
memorandum. The plaintiff made out and delivered his check for twenty dollars,
signed the application for transfer and title which the salesman gave him, and
executed the conditional sale agreement and application for financing which the
salesman had prepared. Before the Ford was delivered to the plaintiff the presi-
dent of the defendant company refused to let the company go through with the
deal at the $195 figure. The plaintiff had not tendered the certificate of title for
his own car to the representatives of the company but he did that immediately
thereafter. The defendant sold the Ford a day or so later. The plaintiff took back
his own car and turned it in to another dealer and was allowed $135 on another
car. He sued to recover from the defendant the difference between $195 and
$135. The trial was by the court who entered judgment against the plaintiff.
On appeal, held, judgment affirmed; the plaintiff had acquiesced in the defend-
ant's abandonment of the contract. Reader v. Frank H. Applegate, Inc., (Wis.
1937) 271 N.W. 839.
The court in the instant case found a simple answer for what might have
been a difficult case. The trial judge had found for the defendant because he
felt that neither the salesman nor the sales manager had the "authority" to close
the deal on the terms specified. In two earlier cases the Wisconsin court has
held that the automobile dealer must suffer when his salesman has negotiated
with a purchaser, accepted payment and has failed to account. In Voell v. Klein,
184 Wis. 620, 200 N.W. 364 (1925), the salesman took the purchaser's old car
in trade, accepted his check for the difference, cashed the check, delivered the
dealer's car to the purchaser, and then absconded with the old car and the
money. The court in that case made much of the fact that it is common
knowledge that cars are taken in trade even in sales of used cars through auto-
mobile agencies, that this was a typical deal, and that payment by check is as
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